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ECONOMIC REVIEWThe international economy, like the domes-
tic economy, has learned to cope during the
past decade or more with an environment of
high risk and high inflation. Economists thus
have increasingly focused their attention on
the responses ofvarious national economies to
a difficult and fast-changing international en-
vironment. This issue of the Economic Review
analyzes three such patterns of response. Can
a regime of floating exchange rates provide
more monetary independence than was possi-
ble under the fixed-rate regime characteristic
of a less inflationary age? How does a nation
(specifically, Japan) overcome a major burst of
inflation, and at what cost to the nation's
growth? Can the "financial deepening" pro-
cess succeed in an era of repressed finance,
where the authorities hold nominal interest
rates rigid even in the face of general price
inflation?
Adrian W Throop addresses the first ques-
tion, examining the claim thatflexible exchange
rates permit a greater independence of mon-
etary policies by weakening linkages between
national interest rates. Under the former Bret-
ton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, for-
eign interest rates moved sympathetically with
U.S. interest rates, and this interest-rate de-
pendence made it difficult for foreign countries
to pursue independent monetary policies. The
system finally collapsed during the raging in-
flation of the early 1970's, mainly because na-
tions were no longer willing to accept such a
lack of monetary independence.
The world's financial authorities thus re-
placed Bretton Woods in 1973 with a flexible
exchange-rate system. Theoretically, with per-
fectly "clean floating" - that is, without any
central-bank intervention in the exchange mar-
ket - foreign interest rates would be com-
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pletely insulated from U.S. rates. But as
Throop notes, central banks in practice have
intervened in foreign-exchange markets about
as frequently under the new system as under
the old. Has "managed floating" then decou-
pled interest rates? "This depends not on the
amount of intervention per se, but rather on
the relative amount ofintervention in response
to interest-rate variations under the two dif-
ferent systems."
For four major countries - Germany, Switz-
erland, France and Belgium - Throop con-
cludes that managed floating generally has sev-
ered short-run linkages between U.S. and
foreign interest rates. This has occurred ap-
parently because of reduced exchange-market
intervention in response to interest-rate vari-
ations, rather than larger offsetting domestic
monetary operations. Canada and the United
Kingdom were atypical, however. In both
countries, linkages to U.S. interest rates did
not change significantly between the two ex-
change-rate regimes, because of unique Ca-
nadian and British policies.
Charles Pigott, in a second article, analyzes
the causes of the rise and fall of Japanese in-
flation during the 1970's, and attempts to gauge
the costs the nation incurred in its successful
effort to reduce inflation. Consumer-price infla-
tion decelerated from 25 percent in 1974 to
only 3 percent in 1978, and the inflation rate
remained below 5 percent in 1979. Japan's
real-growth performance was somewhat less
enviable, however. Between 1965 and 1972,
Japan's real GNP grew at a 10 1!2-percent an-
nual rate but since 1975, real growth has
averaged less than 6 percent.
Japan's experience confirms that the key to
containing inflation is controlling money growth,in Pigott's view. "Without the 1971-72 accel-
eration in money growth, Japan's inflation in
1973 and 1974 would have been much lower
than it actually was. Moreover, the relatively
low inflation ofthe late 1970'swas notthe result
of a fortuitous exchange-rate appreciation or
government fiscal 'discipline', but rather of a
consistent policy of containing money growth."
But substantial increases in the domestic price
level sometimes have resulted from other fac-
tors, such as the oil-price hike of 1974. In
addition, Japan's monetary authorities have
demonstrated that high budget deficits and for-
eign-exchange market interventions need not
inevitably destroy monetary control.
Japan's experience is perhaps most interest-
ing for what it reveals about the costs of re-
ducing inflation, Pigott adds. His evidence sug-
gests that Japan's attempts to reduce inflation
through lower money growth substantially ag-
gravated the 1974 recession. However, the evi-
dence also suggests that the continuation of
slow money growth was not primarily respon-
sible for the sluggishness of the recovery. In-
stead, real growth may have lagged because
the inflation and the ensuing recession under-
mined investor confidence.
Hang-Sheng Cheng, in a third paper, pre-
sents an overview of the financial-deepening
process in eleven Pacific Basin countries during
the inflationary period ofthe past two decades.
For any nation, "financial deepening" repre-
sents an increase in the extent of financing of
production and investment through special-
ized, organized markets. In developing coun-
tries, the process is identified with increases in
the activity of financial intermediaries - such
as commercial banks, savings institutions, and
insurance companies - because ofthe general
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unimportance ofcapital markets. In developed
economies, capital markets play a larger role
than in developing economIes, but financial
intermediation still predominates in the sav-
ings-investment process.
To measure and compare financial deepen-
ing, Cheng provides a cross-section view ofthe
degree of financial intermediation in each
country in 1978, plus a comparison of the
eleven countries' financial-growth process over
the entire 1960-78 period. Financial-interme-
diation ratios in 1978 were significantly higher
than average in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan,
and significantly lower than average in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and the United States. In
terms of growth over time, Malaysia, Singa-
pore and Taiwan achieved nearly uninter-
rupted growth between 1960 and 1978. Most
other countries also experienced at least some
growth - except Australia and New Zealand,
which sustained net declines in their degree of
financial intermediation.
Cheng argues that the real deposit-interest
rate played a critical role in setting the pace of
each nation's financial growth. Positive real
deposit rates maintained over a number of
years invariably led to financial deepening,
while negative real deposit rates (even over
brief periods) could result in sharp financial
disintermediation against an otherwise strongly
upward trend. "Because of the importance of
financial deepening for economic growth," he
concludes, "economic policy should be aimed
at reducing inflation, which by definition lowers
the real deposit rate." He adds that where
inflation cannotbe brought down quickly, inter-
est rates should be allowed to adjust with suf-
ficient flexibility to permit a positive real rate of
return to savings.